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Abstract 
This study investigates the relationship between corporate sustainability performance and earnings 
management practices in a European setting. We measure earnings management based on 
discretionary accruals (cash flow approach) and real activity management. Corporate sustainability 
performance is a multi-dimensional construct that is measured based on data provided by the CSRHub 
database. Employing a European sample of 1,426 firm-year observations, our results reveal a negative 
relationship between corporate sustainability performance and earnings management activities. This 
finding supports the notion that a broad and integrated approach of sustainability performance 
constrains the use of earnings management practices. The results are consistent with recent research on 
U.S. non-financial companies (Kim et al. 2012), indicating the application of similar principles in U.S. 
and European settings. Additional analyses reveal that this relationship is particularly applicable to the 
environmental and community dimensions of sustainability, whereas we find only limited empirical 
evidence on this relationship for the employee dimension. Taken together, our study provides further 
evidence regarding the relevance of corporate sustainability in the financial context.  
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Introduction 
Accounting standards help define the communication process between internal stakeholders (i.e., 
managers) and external stakeholders with regard to a company’s financial and economic performance. 
External stakeholders can use financial statements to assess the present financial situation of a 
company and to distinguish between good- and poor-performing companies. However, because 
accounting standards rely on management judgment to some extent, managers may exploit the 
flexibility of accounting standards to “either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers” (Healy and Wahlen 1999). The motivations for opportunistic earnings 
management arise from the conflicting incentives inherent in the relationship between firm insiders 
and firm outsiders (Leuz et al. 2003); thus, insiders engage in earnings management activities for their 
own benefit and to the detriment of (or at least neglecting the interests of) other stakeholders. In 
addition to regulatory actions that aim to constrain earnings management activities, some researchers 
have recently introduced a new perspective into this discussion: firms' corporate sustainability 
performance.  
 
These researchers describe sustainability performance as a multi-dimensional construct that includes 
economic, environmental and social dimensions. High-level sustainability performance reflects the 
pursuit of corporate social responsibility principles (Wood 1991) that constrain earnings management 
activities. In this context, Gelb and Strawser (2011) state: “[I]ncreased [financial] disclosure is a form 
of socially responsible behavior”. This integrative understanding of sustainability performance is 
reflected in a negative relationship between sustainability performance and earnings management 
activities. Such a negative relationship is also consistent with the reasoning of socio-political theories, 
in particular legitimacy and stakeholder theory. However, other researchers argue that there is a 
positive relationship between sustainability performance and earnings management. These scholars 
claim that superior sustainability performance comes along with higher stakeholder orientation and the 
prevalence of multiple objectives, which grants managers additional leeway for the pursuit of earnings 
management activities (Chih et al. 2008; Gargouri et al. 2010).  
 
Until now, only a limited number of empirical studies have investigated the relationship between 
sustainability performance and earnings management behavior (Chih et al. 2008; Gargouri et al. 2010; 
Labelle et al. 2010; Hong and Andersen 2011; Kim et al. 2012). The results from these studies are 
mixed – often due to methodological differences, including differences attributable to sample 
composition and the measurement of the main variables, in particular. For instance, most studies 
concentrate on accruals management, whereas few studies (Hong and Andersen 2011; Kim et al. 2012) 
integrate real activity management as an earnings management proxy. Moreover, most of these studies 
focus on companies in a U.S. setting. Previous research, however, has shown that earnings 
management practices vary across countries due to country-specific differences in investor protection 
(Leuz et al. 2003). Therefore, the results from these studies may not be generalizable to European 
companies given that the institutional settings of European countries differ from those in the U.S. 
Moreover, there are substantial differences between the sustainability performance of European and 
U.S. companies (Matten and Moon 2008), and it thus remains unclear what type of theoretical 
reasoning might apply in a European context.  
 
Against this background, this study investigates the relationship between sustainability performance 
and earnings management in a European setting. We measure sustainability performance as a multi-
dimensional construct based on data provided by the database CSR Hub. Following Kim et al. (2012), 
our proxies for earnings management include both accrual-based and real activity management 
approaches. Our sample comprises a total of 1,426 firm-year observations and two reporting years. 
The results from our investigation reveal a negative relationship between sustainability performance 
and earnings management practices. Thus, sustainability performance seems to constrain and not 
boost earnings management activities, which is consistent with an integrative understanding of 
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sustainability performance and the reasoning of socio-political theories. More generally, our study 
provides further evidence regarding the relevance of these theories in the financial context. As 
proposed in the model developed by Wood (1991), the principles of corporate social responsibility 
appear to penetrate all levels of an organization, resulting in reduced earnings management by 
management. Apart from the main focus of our research, our study’s findings are also relevant for the 
large body of research addressing the relationship between sustainability performance and financial 
performance (Orlitzky et al. 2003; Schreck 2011; Dixon-Fowler et al. 2012; Gramlich and Finster 
2013). If financial performance is measured based on accounting information, the negative 
relationship between sustainability performance and earnings management weakens a potentially 
positive relationship between sustainability performance and financial performance and reinforces a 
potentially negative relationship. With regard to the earnings management literature, our paper 
suggests expanding the agency-based perspective of most previous research. Outsiders might use the 
sustainability performance of a company as an indicator in assessing the transparency of financial 
reporting behavior.  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the related literature and 
develops our hypotheses. The third section explains the study’s research design, offers an overview of 
the dependent and independent variables and provides a description of the data sample. Descriptive 
results and the findings from both regression analyses and robustness tests are reported in the fourth 
section. The last section concludes. 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Following Healy and Wahlen (1999), "earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers." Earnings management takes place within the 
boundaries of accounting standards and is closely related to the more general concepts of financial 
reporting quality and transparency. Although it might be thought that earnings management could 
assume a form in which it served to signal private information to outsiders, this paper refers to 
earnings management as indicating management’s opportunistic or economically inefficient 
manipulations, such as deflating bad debt or exaggerating sales. Such an approach is supported by a 
substantial number of empirical studies indicating that earnings management frequently occurs near 
certain events, such as share capital increases (Beneish and Vargus 2002; Cohen and Zarowin 2010), 
initial public offerings (Ball and Shivakumar 2008), and mergers/acquisitions (Erickson and Wang 
1999).  
 
We follow previous research on earnings management (Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; 
Zang 2012) and integrate two measurement approaches of earnings management into our study: 
discretionary accruals and real activity management. The first approach relates more to the reporting 
and accounting of earnings, whereas the latter refers to actions that depart from standard business 
practices (Roychowdhury 2006). The prior literature offers empirical evidence regarding the negative 
long-term economic consequences of firms that engage in earnings management (Gunny 2010). Apart 
from these negative effects, earnings management hampers financial reporting transparency and is 
generally considered unethical (Fischer and Rosenzweig 1995; Kaplan 2001). Therefore, discovering 
those measures that are able to constrain earnings management behavior is of interest to practitioners, 
academics and regulators alike. Traditionally, there has been a focus on regulatory actions that aim, in 
particular, at enhancements in corporate governance mechanisms. Recently, Gros and Wallek (2015) 
provide some evidence that firms that voluntarily adhere to stricter regulation in terms of transparency 
show less earnings management behavior. Besides private regulation, some researchers have 
integrated another perspective into this discussion: firms' sustainability performance. These 
researchers present mixed findings on the relationship between sustainability performance and 
earnings management, with some studies indicating a negative relationship (Labelle et al. 2010; Hong 
and Andersen 2011; Kim et al. 2012), some studies indicating a positive relationship (Prior et al. 2008; 
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Gargouri et al. 2010), and one study indicating differential findings depending on different measures 
of earnings management activities (Chih et al. 2008).  
 
From a theoretical perspective, there are different approaches to describing corporate social 
responsibility and corporate sustainability (Carroll 1979; Wood 1991; Elkington 1997). In this study, 
we consider the terms corporate social responsibility, corporate social performance and corporate 
sustainability (performance) as close equivalents. Elkington (1997) describes corporate sustainability 
as a multi-dimensional construct that consists of not only an economic but also other dimensions, 
including the social and environmental dimensions of a company. Such a broad understanding is also 
depicted in Wood’s (1991) model of corporate social performance that is not restricted to social 
aspects, but also covers ecological and economics aspects. Within this model, corporate social 
performance is defined as “a business organization’s configuration of principles of social 
responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as 
they relate to the firm’s societal relationships” (Wood 1991). These principles of Wood’s (1991) 
framework can serve as a starting point for theoretically deducting potential relationships between 
sustainability performance and earnings management practices. The integrative understanding of 
sustainability performance is closely related to socio-political theories, in particular legitimacy and 
stakeholder theory. From an institutional and organizational perspective, companies engage in 
corporate sustainability to achieve or maintain legitimacy among stakeholders, which is essential for a 
company's long-term survival (Suchman 1995; O'Donovan 2002). These stakeholders are typically 
heterogeneous (Freeman 1984) and corporate social responsibility is thus not limited to one 
dimension. From a managerial perspective, Wood's (1991) principle of managerial discretion suggests 
that managers "exercise such discretion as is available to them, toward socially responsible outcomes." 
These same managers are also unlikely to engage in earnings management behavior. Thus, 
understanding sustainability performance as a multi-dimensional and multi-layer construct includes 
the financial reporting behavior of a company. Similarly, Gelb and Strawser (2011) argue that 
“increased [financial] disclosure is a form of socially responsible behavior". Following this reasoning, 
we expect to find a negative relationship between sustainability performance and earnings 
management as formally posited in hypothesis H1. 
H1: There is a negative relationship between sustainability performance and earnings management. 
 
Empirical evidence for the negative relationship between sustainability performance and earnings 
management is presented by Labelle et al. (2010), Hong and Andersen (2011), and Kim et al. (2012). 
Labelle et al. (2010) concentrate on diversity management as the main sustainability performance 
related variable. Using a sample of 156 firm-year observations they reveal a negative and significant 
relationship between a diversity management score provided by Jantzi Research and earnings 
management. Results from their study indicate that particularly the employee-related dimension of 
sustainability might affect earnings management. However, the sample composition of the companies 
in the Canadian Social Investment Database may limit the generalizability of their findings due to 
positive self-selection effects. These problems are overcome by Hong and Andersen (2011) and Kim 
et al. (2012), who reveal a negative relationship between sustainability performance and earnings 
management in U.S. samples. Both studies rely on the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) ratings of 
strengths and concerns for the measurement of CSR. Whereas Hong and Andersen (2011) only 
integrate accruals quality into a multivariate analysis, Kim et al. (2012) integrate various measurement 
approaches for earnings management, including discretionary accruals, proxies for real activities 
manipulation, and releases from Accounting and Auditing Enforcement (AAER).  
 
In contrast to a negative relationship between sustainability performance and earnings management, 
the literature typically refers to managerial opportunism as an explanation for a positive relationship. 
These scholars argue that managerial opportunism is more likely to occur if a company pursues 
multiple objectives (Chih et al. 2008; Gargouri et al. 2010). In this case, multiple stakeholders are 
involved, and the manager obtains additional leeway that is used to engage in earnings management 
activities for the manager's own benefit at the expense of the firm. Another explanation for a positive 
relationship between sustainability performance and earnings management is presented by Gargouri et 
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al. (2010), who conjecture that the additional costs associated with sustainability performance create 
incentives for managers to engage in earnings management activities. Finally, some researchers argue 
that sustainability performance per se arises from managerial opportunism and is thus positively 
associated with earnings management (McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Prior et al. 2008; Kim et al. 
2012). These different arguments are summed up and formally stated in H2: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between sustainability performance and earnings management. 
 
Empirical evidence for such a positive relationship is presented by Prior et al. (2008), Chih et al. 
(2008) and Gargouri et al. (2010). However, substantial limitations in the research setting employed 
by Prior et al. (2008) may affect the generalizability of their findings with respect to our own research 
interest. Contrary to our understanding of the relationship between sustainability performance and 
earnings management, Prior et al. (2008) argue that managers with motivations to manage earnings 
engage in CSR to gain support from various groups of stakeholders and thus regress sustainability 
performance on earnings management. Our argumentation is more consistent with the research setting 
of Gargouri et al. (2010) and Chih et al. (2008). These authors regress earnings management on 
sustainability performance controlling for a number of variables that are typically associated with 
earnings management. While the focus of Gargouri et al. (2010) is trained solely on discretionary 
accruals, a more refined picture is presented by Chih et al. (2008), who show a negative relationship 
between sustainability performance and earnings losses and decreases avoidance and a positive 
relationship between sustainability performance and earnings aggressiveness. However, these authors 
measure sustainability performance as inclusion in the FRSE4Good Global Index, whereas recent 
research suggests that this measurement relates more to a company’s reputation for sustainability 
rather than to the actual sustainability performance of a company (Cho et al. 2012).  
 
Overall, the inconsistent findings of previous empirical studies might be due to methodological 
inconsistencies with regard to variable measurements and sample selection. Although these 
methodological caveats are mainly resolved in Kim et al. (2012), the empirical findings in that study 
are restricted to U.S. companies and might differ in a European setting due to the different 
environments in which European companies and capital markets operate. 
Research Design 
Measurement of Earnings Management 
1.1.1 Discretionary Accruals 
Earnings management research has traditionally concentrated on investigating accruals that arise as a 
discrepancy between the timing of cash flow and the accounting recognition of the transaction. These 
total accruals are split into discretionary and non-discretionary components (Healy 1985; L. DeAngelo 
1986; Jones 1991). The amount of discretionary accruals is an indicator of earnings management. The 
calculation of total accruals can be based on either the cash flow or on the balance sheet approach. In 
this study, we use accruals from cash flow because they are less prone to influences from outside 
shocks. These accruals are calculated as earnings before extraordinary items less cash flow from 
operations.  
 
We measure discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). A 
comparison of different measurement models for discretionary accruals by Kothari et al. (2005) 
indicates that the modified Jones model, including ROAt-1 as an additional regressor, is powerful in 
controlling for performance. All variables are scaled by lagged total assets to avoid 
heteroskedasticity.3 We use robust regressions for our calculations to avoid overemphasizing outliers. 
Discretionary accruals are estimated using the following regression by industry and year for each 
sample firm i: 
 
                                                 
3 Kothari et al. (2005) find that including a constant term avoids misspecification. 
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where 
TAt total accruals at year t 
At total assets at year t 
∆SALESt change in sales in year t from year t-1 
∆ARt change in accounts receivable in year t from year t-1 
PPEt gross property, plant, and equipment at year t 
IBt income before extraordinary items at year t 
The resulting coefficients are used to calculate expected total accruals for each sample firm. The 
difference between actual total accruals and expected total accruals represents discretionary 
accruals. These accruals are positive (POS_DA) if actual accruals are higher than expected 
accruals; otherwise, they are zero or negative (NEG_DA). Because both negative and positive 
amounts indicate discretionary behavior, the absolute value (ABS_DA) is also considered. 
1.1.2 Real Activity Management 
Companies also undertake earnings management through real activity management (RAM), which 
consists of purposeful actions meant to influence earnings and other accounts. These activities include 
the timing or structuring of an operation, investment, or financing transaction. Roychowdhury (2006) 
employs several real activity measures, based on Dechow et al. (1998). Following Cohen et al. (2008), 
three of these measures are employed in this study to indicate abnormal production costs 
(RM_PROD), abnormal discretionary expenses (RM_DISX), and abnormal cash flow from operations 
(RM_CFO). First, production costs (Prod) consist of the costs of goods sold (COGS) plus changes in 
inventory. Increasing production over the regular amount can inflate earnings and lower the cost of 
goods sold (COGS) to report higher operating margins. Furthermore, overproduction can result in high 
abnormal production costs relative to sales (and low CFO). The model to estimate normal production 
costs is calculated per industry and year as follows: 
 
As above, the resulting coefficients are used to calculate expected production costs for each sample 
firm. The difference between actual and expected amounts is the abnormal segment (RM_PROD). The 
second accounting item is discretionary expense (DISX), which consists of research and development 
expenses, selling, general, and administrative expenses, and advertising expenses. Typically, they are 
expensed as occurred. However, companies can deflate this account to increase their income. To 
facilitate the interpretation, the results are multiplied by (-1). Higher abnormal amounts (RM_DISX) 
indicate a stronger influence. We estimate the normal level of discretionary expenses as: 
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The third item is operating cash flow (CFO), which can be influenced by several means. Management 
can temporarily reduce prices or allow for lenient credit terms to increase income. Due to lower 
margins, the cash inflow per sold item is lower than normal. Furthermore, overproduction can reduce 
operating cash flow when sales are constant. Conversely, cutting discretionary expenses could increase 
cash flow from operations. Abnormal cash flow from operations (RM_CFO) is the third proxy for real 
activity management. The abnormal amount is estimated by the residuals in equation (4). We expect to 
predominantly find actual cash flow that is lower than expected cash flow due to strong 
overproduction activities. To harmonize the interpretations of our main results, we multiply the 
residuals by (-1). Hence, higher values of RM_CFO indicate more intense earnings management 
activities. We run the following regression to estimate normal CFO: 
 
Both abnormally high and abnormally low discretionary amounts indicate real activities management. 
The effects of the RM_PROD, RM_CFO, and RM_DISX measures can occur individually or 
mutually. Therefore, the combined proxy (COM_RM) of aggregated abnormal production and 
abnormal discretionary expenses is also examined. Due to the ambiguous effects inherent in operating 
cash flow (Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2012), we follow Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and do not 
include this proxy in the combined measure, which distinguishes our analysis from Kim et al. (2012), 
who include all three items in the combined measure. A substantial amount of the combined proxy 
indicates the use of substantial real activity management. 
Measurement of Corporate Sustainability Performance 
Consistent with the theoretical understanding of sustainability performance as a multi-dimensional 
construct, sustainability performance is measured as the composite performance including the 
dimensions of employees, environment, and community. We rely on data provided by the CSRHub 
database (for the following description, CSRHub (2013)). The CSRHub database offers access to a 
broad variety of information on sustainability performance and ratings for over 6,700 companies in 82 
countries. Ratings are based on 12 indicators in four categories: employees, the environment, 
community, and corporate governance. CSRHub extracts data from more than 175 data sources (e.g., 
ASSET4/Thomson Reuters, Carbon Disclosure Project, EIRIS, GovernanceMetrics International/ 
Corporate Library, IW Financial, MSCI, Trucost, and Vigeo, among others), transforms them into a 
[0, 100] scale and maps them to the four categories. On overage, 500 data elements are included in 
each rating. Companies with fewer than 70 available data elements are excluded from the rating. 
Compared with traditional analyst-based rating methods, the measurement is based on a multi-
stakeholder approach that includes evaluations and ratings from a variety of stakeholders, such as SRI 
sources, NGOs, government groups, customer surveys and others. Such a broad measurement 
approach enhances the validity and reliability of the measurement. However, CSRHub does not 
disclose the transformation and mapping procedure in detail for proprietary reasons. As this caveat 
also applies to other sustainability performance ratings and hence to some of the original values, it is 
mitigated by the huge number of data elements the measurement comprises. Currently, more than 
8,400 different data elements are included. For some data elements, original data values are displayed 
(depending on license agreements).  
 
Moreover, the quantitative measurement of sustainability performance within the [0, 100] range 
accounts for variance within each subcategory and hence resolves the methodological difficulties 
associated with previous research using a binary measurement approach. Our sustainability 
performance variable CSP is the average of the scores for the three categories of employees, 
environment, and community and ranges between [0, 100]. As previous research has demonstrated the 
significant impact of corporate governance on financial disclosure (Eng and Mak 2003; Cheng and 
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Courtenay 2006), we follow Kim et al. (2012) and Labelle et al. (2010) and include corporate 
governance as a separate control variable (GOV) into our models. For univariate analyses and 
robustness checks, we follow previous research (Hong and Andersen 2011; Kim et al. 2012) and 
transform CSP into a binary variable, CSP_binary, that equals 1 if CSP is equal to or greater than the 
median of CSP in our sample and 0 otherwise. Companies with CSP_binary variables equal to 1 are 
CSP companies, and companies with CSP_binary variables equal to 0 are non-CSP companies.  
Sample and Methodological Approach 
Our sample firms are drawn from the CSRHub in 2010 and 2011, with sufficient data available in 
COMPUSTAT to calculate the required regressions. We use annual data, and we eliminate banks and 
financial institutions (GICS 40).4 The final sample includes 713 companies in each of 2010 and 2011, 
resulting in a total of 1,426 firm-year observations. Panel A of Table 1 shows the distribution of 
companies by GICS code. The largest number of firms in our sample are Industrial firms, and a large 
number of the remaining firms are in the Consumer Discretionary and Materials sector. Panel B of 
Table 1 shows the distribution of company years by country. The largest share of companies, 
approximately 34 percent, are based in the United Kingdom. France and Germany are also strongly 
represented in the sample.  
  
Insert table 1 about here 
 
The relation between earnings management and sustainability performance in the sample firms can be 
measured with two regression models for sample firm i and period t (Kim et al. 2012):   
 
 
 
where 
DA = ABS_DA or POS_DA or NEG_DA 
RAM = RM_PROD or RM_DISX or RM_CFO or COM_RM; 
CSP = average score of sustainability performance, calculated as the mean of the scores in the three 
main categories of community, employees, and the environment; 
COM_RM = combined measure of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses; 
SIZE = natural logarithm of the market value of equity; 
MB = market-to-book ratio of equity; 
ROA = return on total assets; 
                                                 
4 Excluding banks and financial institutions is a common procedure. See, e.g., Leuz et al. (2003). 
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AUDIT = indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor, and 0 
otherwise; 
LEV = long-term debt by total assets;  
RD_INT = R&D intensity, calculated as R&D expense divided by net sales; 
GOV = rating of the main governance category as provided by the CSRHub database; 
AGE = natural logarithm of years since IPO; 
ADMIRED = an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm is listed in Fortune’s World’s 
Most Admired Companies, and 0 otherwise; 
INVESTOR = investor protection index for the country of each firm that ranges from 0 to 10, with 
higher scores indicating higher investor protection (taken from the World Bank); 
CREDITOR = creditor rights index for the country of each firm that ranges from 0 to 10 with higher 
scores indicating higher creditor rights (taken from the World Bank); 
INDUSTRY = industry group dummy variables as reported in Table 1, with Industrials as the reference 
category; 
YEAR = year dummy with 2010 as the reference category. 
 
Equation (5) estimates the relation of accruals management to sustainability performance. The 
dependent variable of discretionary accruals (DA) is the proxy for accruals management. Equation (6) 
estimates the relation of real activity management to sustainability performance. The dependent 
variables are either abnormal cash flow from operations (RM_CFO), abnormal production costs 
(RM_PROD), abnormal discretionary expenses (RM_DISX), or the combined measure of abnormal 
real activity (COM_RM).  
 
Companies use accruals and real activity management sometimes as substitutes and sometimes as 
complements (Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 2012). Hence, they can occur at the same time or separately. 
Following Cohen et al. (2008), we control for the substitution effect of the two techniques by 
including the combined measure of RAM (COM_RM) in equation (5). Correspondingly, equation (6) 
includes the discretionary accruals measure (ABS_DA) as a control variable.  
 
Additional control variables are included to avoid correlated omitted variables resulting from financial 
reporting behavior and sustainability performance. Prior et al. (2008) find a significant relation 
between size and sustainability performance, whereas Prawitt et al. (2009) demonstrate a correlation 
between profitability and earnings management. Therefore, the variables for size (SIZE) and 
profitability (ROA) are added.5 Roychowdhury (2006) includes the market-to-book ratio (MB) to 
control for the effects of firm-specific growth opportunities. Prior studies find that a higher audit 
quality results in lower earnings management (Francis et al. 1999). Because the Big 4 audit firms are 
expected to provide better audits, we add indicator variables for their presence in these companies 
(AUDIT). Additional control variables are leverage (LEV) and R&D-intensity.6 Previous research has 
shown that leverage is significantly associated with accounting choices both in terms of income-
increasing accruals due to contractual accounting-based constraints (Press and Weintrop 1990) and 
income-decreasing accruals due to contractual renegotiations (H. DeAngelo et al. 1994). According to 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000), R&D expense (RD_INT) is an important variable for effects on 
sustainability performance. As discussed above, we include the corporate governance dimension of 
sustainability performance as a separate control variable, thus accounting for previous research on the 
effects of corporate governance on financial disclosure quality (Eng and Mak 2003; Cheng and 
Courtenay 2006). A control for company age (AGE) is required because financial reporting as well as 
sustainability performance can change based on a company’s development stage. Such an effect has 
previously been shown by Anthony and Ramesh (1992). Firm reputation is included because we 
                                                 
5Kim et al. (2012) observe no different effect between the control variables industry adjusted ROA and overall 
ROA.  
6 A control variable for equity offering incentives is dropped due to low data availability. However, except for 
the United Kingdom, almost no represented country shows a similar importance for the equity market as is 
shown in the U.S. sample employed by Kim et al. (2012). Therefore, the variable is less relevant to our study. 
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expect it to have a positive effect on earnings management activities under legitimacy theory. 
However, reputation is found to decrease the motivation for earnings management (Luchs et al. 2009). 
The corresponding indicator variable (ADMIRED) is based on the list of Fortune’s World’s Most 
Admired Companies. Finally, we include INVESTOR and CREDITOR to control for the extent of 
investor and creditor protection across countries. Leuz et al. (2003) reveal a strong link between the 
extent of investor protection in each country and earnings management activities. Strong protection of 
outsiders’ rights reduces insiders’ incentives to manage earnings. We insert INVESTOR as a proxy for 
the degree of investor protection in the country of each firm and CREDITOR as a proxy for the degree 
of creditor protection in the respective country. Our variables are drawn from the World Bank 
database,7 and we follow Gunny (2010) and winsorize all continuous variables at the top and bottom 
1% to limit the influence of outliers. 
Results 
Descriptive Results  
Table 2 presents the descriptive results for the full sample and by low-performers and high-performers 
in terms of sustainability, respectively. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here  
 
Mean and median values of CSP equal approximately 53 (on a scale between 0 and 100) with a 
standard deviation of 8.4. The descriptive statistics show that our sample firms engage in earnings 
management activities through discretionary accruals. However, the mean values of the proxies are 
small and substantially lower than previous studies (Prior et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2012) indicating that 
the European sample firms engage in less earnings management. Similarly, although we find some 
evidence of earnings management activities through real activity management, the mean values for 
that measure are also low. The descriptive statistics for the control variables show that almost 94% of 
the sample firms are audited by Big 4 accounting firms. Our sample has an average market 
capitalization of 7.6 bn EUR (original value) and an average annual ROA of 4.8%. 
 
A comparison between low sustainability performers (“CSP low-performers” are firms with a CSP 
value equal to or below the median) and high sustainability performers (“CSP high-performers” are 
firms with a CSP value above the median) yields significantly lower mean values of accrual-based 
proxies for earnings management practices (ABS_DA, POS_DA, NEG_DA) for high sustainability 
performers than for low sustainability performers (p < .01). Similar results are obtained for the real 
activity management proxy RM_DISX, but not for RM_CFO, RM_PROD and COM_RM. In addition, 
we find significant differences between low sustainability performers and high sustainability 
performers with regard to most of our control variables, indicating that high sustainability performers 
are larger, older, less profitable, and more frequently audited by Big 4 accounting firms. Furthermore, 
high sustainability performers are characterized by lower growth opportunities and higher leverage 
and more frequently belong to Fortune’s World’s Most Admired Companies than low sustainability 
performers.  
 
Table 3 presents Pearson correlation coefficients revealing significant negative correlations between 
CSP and ABS_DA and RM_DISX and significant positive correlations between CSP and POS_DA as 
well as NEG_DA. Overall, these correlations tend to support the notion that sustainability 
performance exerts an overall beneficial influence on earnings management practices (as posited in 
hypothesis H1). Moreover, there are significant positive correlations between CSP and SIZE, AUDIT, 
LEV, GOV, AGE, and ADMIRED, and there are significant negative correlations between CSP and 
MB, ROA, INVESTOR and CREDITOR.  
 
                                                 
7 Access to the database is provided through http://databank.worldbank.org. 
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Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Results from Regression Analysis 
The results from a multivariate regression analysis with robust standard errors are displayed in Table 
4. Additional tests do not indicate problems of multicollinearity in our data. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Overall, we find support for hypothesis H1 that posits a negative relationship between sustainability 
performance and earnings management activities. In particular, there is a negative and significant (p < 
0.1) relation between CSP and ABS_DA and between CSP and POS_DA. Hence, both absolute and 
income-increasing earnings management activities decrease as high sustainability performers 
increases. Our results do not show any significant relationship with regard to income-decreasing 
earnings management activities (NEG_DA). Moreover, there is a negative and significant relationship 
between CSP and our proxies for real activity management with regard to production costs 
(RM_PROD, p < 0.1), discretionary expenses (RM_DISX, p < 0.001), and the combined measurement 
(COM_RM, p < 0.01). The results from the regression analysis do not present a significant 
relationship only for the variable measuring real activity management through cash flow (RM_CFO). 
In sum, we find evidence for the notion that the principle of public responsibility refers to a broad and 
integrated understanding of sustainability performance and consequently affects a company’s financial 
reporting behavior. Moreover, neither of our models finds support for hypothesis H2, which posits a 
positive relationship between sustainability performance and earnings management. Taken together, 
these findings support the notion of a beneficial penetration of sustainability performance into all 
aspects of a company (H1), whereas there is no evidence that high-level sustainability performance 
grants managers additional leeway that they use to engage in earnings management.  
 
The results from the regression analyses also offer insights into the relationship between other 
variables and earnings management. First, there is only limited evidence for the substitution 
hypothesis of earnings management activities that posits that firms change from predominantly using 
accruals-based earnings management to employing real activity management (Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 
2012). We find support for this effect only with regard to RM_CFO. Next, our results show that firm 
size is negatively associated with earnings management indicating that larger firms are less likely to 
engage in earnings management activities. Again, this finding is consistent with the reasoning behind 
legitimacy theory, as larger companies face greater public pressure that constrains them from engaging 
in earnings management. With respect to the market-to-book ratio, return on assets, leverage and R&D 
intensity, our findings report predominantly negative associations with earnings management, 
revealing that firms with more prospective growth opportunities, higher returns on assets, higher 
leverage and higher R&D intensity are less likely to engage in earnings management. However, the 
type of auditor is not significantly associated with earnings management. Counter-intuitively, we find 
evidence for a positive relationship between governance and some proxies for real activity 
management. This finding is contradictory to the literature that assumes a positive effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms on financial disclosure because corporate governance mechanisms enhance 
monitoring quality and consequently reduce benefits from withholding information (Forker 1992). A 
possible explanation for this finding might be a potential crowding-out effect (Bénabou and Tirole 
2006) of the more explicit and formal structures of corporate governance on the more informal and 
implicit aspects of sustainability performance. With respect to AGE, our findings are mixed, revealing 
a positive relationship with NEG_DA, i.e., older companies engage in less earnings management 
activities, and a positive relationship with RM_CFO, i.e., older companies engage in more earnings 
management activities. Notably, the associations between ADMIRED and earnings management are 
predominantly positive, revealing that companies with better reputations engage in more earnings 
management. This finding resembles that of Cho et al. (2012), who show that environmental 
reputation is negatively associated with environmental performance. Counter-intuitively, there is an 
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overall positive relationship between INVESTOR and earnings management proxies, indicating that 
earnings management activities are more common in countries with higher investor protection. 
However, there is an overall negative relationship between CREDITOR and earnings management 
suggesting that earnings management activities are less common in countries with stronger creditor 
rights. 
 
We perform supplemental analyses to check the robustness of our main results. First, we rerun the 
regressions, including CSP_binary instead of CSP as our main variable of interest. In so doing, we can 
differentiate between sustainability and non-sustainability companies. Although we prefer a 
continuous over a dichotomous variable, we include this broader measure as a robustness check to 
account for the problem that very small differences may not result in corresponding earnings 
management activities. Overall, the results (unreported) from these analyses are consistent with our 
main findings, revealing a negative and significant relationship between sustainability performance 
and earnings management. However, in contrast to our main results, the relationship becomes 
insignificant with respect to POS_DA.  
 
Second, we check whether our results are driven primarily by one particular dimension of 
sustainability, and we thus rerun the regression analyses for each dimension of sustainability 
separately. Thus, we replace our main variable of interest, CSP, with three variables that correspond to 
the sustainability assessments in the community (CSP_COM), employees (CSP_EMP) and the 
environment (CSP_ENV) dimensions. Our results (unreported) are almost identical to our main 
findings with respect to CSP_COM and CSP_ENV, indicating negative and significant relationships 
with various proxies for earnings management. However, with respect to the employee dimension, 
negative and significant associations are obtained only for RM_PROD, RM_DISX and COM_RM, 
while the results for the accruals-based proxies of earnings management are insignificant. This finding 
is surprising to the extent that we would expect to find the employee dimension of sustainability 
particularly relevant with respect to earnings management because this behavior is mainly driven by 
employee (managerial) action.  
Conclusions 
This study investigates the relationship between firms' sustainability performance and earnings 
management activities with respect to two opposing hypotheses. On the one hand, based on Wood's 
(1991) model and on socio-political theories, a negative relationship between sustainability 
performance and earnings management is posited (H1). Following this reasoning, sustainability 
performance is a multi-dimensional construct that affects all levels of an organization, including 
financial reporting behavior. Briefly stated, "increased [financial] disclosure is a form of socially 
responsible behavior" (Gelb and Strawser 2011). On the other hand, there might be a positive 
relationship between sustainability performance and earnings management (H2) due to managerial 
opportunism. The basic argument for such a relationship is that higher sustainability performance is 
accompanied by broader stakeholder orientation and the existence of multiple objectives, which results 
in additional leeway for managerial opportunism. Empirical evidence regarding this relationship is 
mixed and derives primarily from studies of U.S. firms.  
 
We investigate this relationship in a sample of 713 European firms and two reporting years. Our 
research design includes a variety of accruals-based and real activity management proxies for earnings 
management. Sustainability performance is measured based on data provided by CSRHub that cover 
multiple dimensions of sustainability. Results from our regression analyses support hypothesis H1, 
revealing a predominantly negative and significant relationship between sustainability performance 
and earnings management practices. This finding supports the notion that a broad and integrated 
approach of sustainability performance – as described by Wood (1991) – constrains the use of 
earnings management practices. We find this relationship for both a discretionary accruals-based 
measurement approach to assessing earnings management and for several proxies for real activity 
management. The results are consistent with recent research on U.S. non-financial companies (Kim et 
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al. 2012), indicating the application of similar principles in U.S. and European settings. Additional 
analyses reveal that this relationship is particularly applicable to the environmental and community 
dimensions of sustainability, whereas we find only limited empirical evidence on this relationship for 
the employee dimension.  
 
Taken together, our study adds new insights into the importance of integrative and socio-political 
theories in earnings management research. Whereas previous research has focused predominantly on 
regulatory actions, our study indicates that sustainability performance offers an effective approach to 
constrain earnings management activities. In addition, the results from our study also must be 
integrated into the ongoing discussion on the 'value relevance' of sustainability performance (Orlitzky 
et al. 2003; Schreck 2011; Dixon-Fowler et al. 2012; Gramlich and Finster 2013). Results from these 
studies might be biased if they rely on accounting numbers and do not account for the link between 
sustainability performance and earnings management. As with all empirical studies, our study is also 
subject to a number of limitations, which also present opportunities for future research. 
 
First, our sample size is rather small and covers only two reporting periods. It would be a valuable 
contribution to enlarge the sample size and include additional reporting periods. In addition, further 
analyses might study the relationship between sustainability performance and earnings management 
around certain corporate events that are typically prone to earnings management activities, such as 
share capital increases and initial public offerings. Second, our measurement of sustainability 
performance relies on data provided by the CSRHub database. Although this measurement approach 
overcomes the reliance on a single aspect of sustainability performance by integrating data from 
different rating agencies, the measure nevertheless lacks transparency. Future research should 
therefore consider the use of alternative measurement approaches that are based on publicly available 
data to improve the external validity of sustainability performance measures and ensure the 
comparability of empirical results.  
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Table 1 Sample Distribution by Industry and Country   
This table presents the sample distribution by industry (Panel A) and by country (Panel B) for 2010, 2011 and 
the total sample.  
Panel A: Distribution by Industry      
GICS Sector 
GICS 
Sector 
Code 
No. 
of Obs. 
2010 
No. 
of Obs. 
2011 
Total % of Sample 
Energy 10 49 51 100 7.01% 
Materials 15 81 81 162 11.36% 
Industrials 20 201 198 399 27.98% 
Consumer Discretionary 25 140 143 283 19.85% 
Consumer Staples 30 61 60 121 8.49% 
Health Care 35 52 50 102 7.15% 
Information Technology 45 57 54 111 7.78% 
Telecommunication Services 50 30 32 62 4.35% 
Utilities 55 42 44 86 6.03% 
Total  713 713 1,426 100.00% 
Panel B: Distribution by Country      
Country 
ISO 
Country 
Code 
No. 
of Obs. 
2010 
No. 
of Obs. 
2011 
Total % of Sample 
Austria AUT 14 15 29 2.03% 
Belgium BEL 18 17 35 2.45% 
Czech Republic CZE 2 2 4 0.28% 
Denmark DNK 19 19 38 2.66% 
Finland FIN 24 25 49 3.44% 
France FRA 77 76 153 10.73% 
Germany DEU 71 74 145 10.17% 
Greece GRC 14 13 27 1.89% 
Hungary HUN 3 3 6 0.42% 
Ireland IRL 13 13 26 1.82% 
Italy ITA 34 34 68 4.77% 
Luxembourg LUX 8 9 17 1.19% 
Netherlands NLD 30 31 61 4.28% 
Norway NOR 18 19 37 2.59% 
Poland POL 6 11 17 1.19% 
Portugal PRT 8 8 16 1.12% 
Spain ESP 32 30 62 4.35% 
Sweden SWE 34 33 67 4.70% 
Switzerland CHE 43 42 85 5.96% 
United Kingdom GBR 245 239 484 33.94% 
Total  713 713 1,426 100.00% 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics  
  Full sample      CSP low-performer   
CSP high-
performer   
 n Mean Std. Dev. 25th Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile n Mean Median n Mean Median p-value 
Dependent Variables              
ABS_DA  1,426 0.034 0.026 0.012 0.026 0.050 731 0.038 0.030 695 0.029 0.022 0.000 
POS_DA  775 0.033 0.024 0.012 0.027 0.050 393 0.036 0.030 382 0.029 0.022 0.000 
NEG_DA 651 -0.035 0.029 -0.051 -0.025 -0.011 338 -0.041 -0.031 313 -0.029 -0.022 0.000 
RM_PROD 1,426 0.003 0.127 -0.082 0.018 0.100 731 0.005 0.022 695 0.002 0.014 0.617 
RM_DISX  1,426 0.003 0.103 -0.067 0.014 0.081 731 0.008 0.022 695 -0.002 0.007 0.070 
RM_CFO  1,426 0.003 0.049 -0.031 0.005 0.040 731 0.001 0.004 695 0.004 0.007 0.148 
COM_RM  1,426 0.007 0.216 -0.133 0.032 0.167 731 0.013 0.043 695 0.000 0.026 0.240 
Variable of Interest              
CSP 1,426 52.575 8.360 45.000 53.000 60.000        
Control Variables              
SIZE  1,426 7.821 1.186 6.853 7.778 8.753 731 7.314 7.242 695 8.355 8.497 0.000 
MB  1,426 2.347 1.358 1.226 1.976 3.148 731 2.470 2.097 695 2.217 1.830 0.000 
ROA  1,426 0.047 0.042 0.017 0.042 0.075 731 0.052 0.045 695 0.043 0.038 0.000 
AUDIT  1,426 0.938 0.241 1.000 1.000 1.000 731 0.927 1.000 695 0.950 1.000 0.083 
LEV  1,426 0.187 0.129 0.083 0.182 0.288 731 0.173 0.160 695 0.203 0.194 0.000 
RD_INT  1,426 0.014 0.022 0.000 0.001 0.020 731 0.014 0.000 695 0.014 0.002 0.922 
GOV  1,426 4.993 7.553 -1.000 5.000 12.000 731 -0.157 0.000 695 10.410 12.000 0.000 
AGE  1,426 2.772 0.663 2.303 2.708 3.219 731 2.703 2.639 695 2.845 2.773 0.000 
ADMIRED  1,426 0.088 0.283 0.000 0.000 0.000 731 0.008 0.000 695 0.171 0.000 0.000 
INVESTOR  1,426 6.202 1.590 5.000 6.000 8.000 731 6.287 6.300 695 6.112 6.000 0.038 
CREDITOR  1,426 7.817 2.015 7.000 8.000 10.000 731 7.947 8.000 695 7.681 7.000 0.013 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regression analyses for the full sample. In addition, p-values (two-tailed) from a t-test of mean differences 
between the group of CSP low-performers and the group of CSP high-performers are reported. CSP low-performers include all companies with a CSP equal to or below the 
median. ABS-DA refers to the absolute value of both positive accruals (POS_DA) and negative accruals (NEG_DA). RM_PROD, RM_DISX, and RM_CFO refer to earnings 
management proxies from the management of production (RM_PROD), discretionary expenses (RM_DISX) and operating cash flow (RM_CFO). COM_RM is the aggregation 
of RM_PROD and RM_DISX. CSP is our main variable of interest and proxies for a firm's sustainability performance based on data provided by CSRHub. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity, MB is the market-to-book ratio of equity, ROA is the return on total assets, AUDIT indicates whether the firm is audited by a Big 4 
auditor (equals 1) or not (equals 0), LEV is long-term debt by total assets, RD_INT is the R&D intensity, GOV relates to the sophistication of a firm's corporate governance 
system, AGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since IPO, ADMIRED proxies whether the firm is listed in Fortune's World's Most Admired Companies (equals 1) or 
not (equals 0), INVESTOR is an investor protection index from the World Bank for the respective country of each firm and CREDITOR is a creditor rights index from World 
Bank for the respective country of each firm. 
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Table 3 Pearson correlation coefficients  
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.  13.  14.  
1. CSP 1.000                 
2. ABS_DA -0.187 *** 1.000                
3. POS_DA 0.150 *** 0.997 *** 1.000               
4. NEG_DA 0.234 *** -0.997 ***  1.000              
5. RM_PROD -0.018 0.002 0.025 0.019 1.000             
6. RM_DISX -0.064 ** 0.013 -0.016 -0.041 0.734 *** 1.000            
7. RM_CFO 0.033 0.068 ** 0.329 *** 0.182 *** 0.454 *** 0.161 *** 1.000           
8. COM_RM -0.039 0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.940 *** 0.912 *** 0.342 *** 1.000          
9. SIZE 0.522 *** -0.241 *** -0.161 *** 0.323 *** -0.129 *** -0.110 *** -0.159 *** -0.130 *** 1.000         
10. MB -0.086 *** 0.069 *** 0.054 -0.078 ** -0.318 *** -0.183 *** -0.456 *** -0.270 *** 0.144 *** 1.000        
11. ROA -0.093 *** 0.000 ** 0.039 0.041 -0.352 *** -0.174 *** -0.507 *** -0.291 *** 0.166 *** 0.586 *** 1.000       
12. AUDIT 0.060 ** 0.019 0.027 -0.004 -0.043 -0.001 -0.046 * -0.028 0.095 *** 0.073 *** 0.033 1.000    
13. LEV 0.127 *** -0.125 *** -0.174 *** 0.071 * 0.078 *** 0.124 *** 0.004 0.104 *** 0.103 *** -0.116 *** -0.257 *** 0.029 1.000   
14. RD_INT 0.014 0.051 * 0.065 * -0.037 -0.109 *** -0.251 *** -0.047 * -0.179 *** 0.055 ** 0.172 *** 0.073 *** 0.033 -0.204 *** 1.000  
15. GOV 0.786 *** -0.105 *** -0.076 ** 0.141 *** -0.004 -0.005 0.002 -0.004 0.432 *** -0.006 -0.027 0.131 *** 0.117 *** -0.013  
16. AGE 0.143 *** -0.075 *** 0.017 0.184 *** 0.000 -0.006 0.099 *** -0.004 0.075 *** -0.053 ** -0.019 0.073 *** 0.032 0.041  
17. ADMIRED 0.349 *** -0.102 *** -0.069 0.145 *** 0.004 -0.009 0.025 -0.004 0.415 *** -0.015 0.002 0.018 0.022 0.102 *** 
18. INVESTOR -0.083 *** 0.122 *** 0.077 ** -0.162 *** 0.027 0.074 *** -0.043 0.046 * -0.279 *** 0.031 0.058 ** 0.095 *** -0.009 -0.170 *** 
19. CREDITOR -0.085 *** 0.076 *** 0.094 *** -0.050 -0.070 *** -0.041 -0.084 *** -0.063 * -0.230 *** 0.129 *** 0.150 *** 0.090 *** -0.180 *** 0.018  
 15.  16.  17.  18. 19.                    
15. GOV 1.000                  
16. AGE 0.140 *** 1.000                 
17. ADMIRED 0.313 *** 0.118 *** 1.000                
18. INVESTOR 0.146 *** 0.067 ** -0.108 *** 1.000               
19. CREDITOR 0.127 *** 0.056 ** -0.044 * 0.646 *** 1.000              
The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 4 Regression results for discretionary accruals and real activity management 
 
ABS_DA 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
POS_DA 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
NEG_DA 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
 RM_PROD 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
RM_DISX 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
 RM_CFO 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
COM_RM 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
 
           
CSP -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0003  -0.0013 -0.0019 0.0001 -0.0031 
 (-1.9369) * (-1.7067) * (1.2382) (-1.9348) * (-3.3303) *** (0.3932)  (-2.6945) *** 
COM_RM -0.0001 0.0040 0.0066     
 (-0.0319)  (0.8716) (1.1785)     
ABS_DA    -0.0259 0.0463 0.1102 -0.0075 
    (-0.1893) (0.4153)  (2.1639) ** (-0.0319)  
SIZE -0.0046 -0.0026 0.0073 -0.0065 -0.0034 -0.0041 -0.0109 
 (-6.0553) *** (-2.6981) *** (5.8785) *** (-1.7212) * (-1.0808)  (-3.1954) *** (-1.6687) * 
MB 0.0022 0.0011 -0.0036 -0.0144 -0.0072 -0.0081 -0.0203 
 (3.2213) *** (1.2341) (-3.3829) ***  (-4.6355) *** (-2.7175) ***  (-7.2268) *** (-3.7405) *** 
ROA -0.0462 -0.0121 0.0865 -0.8199 -0.2401 -0.4743 -1.0861 
 (-2.0018) ** (-0.4102)  (2.3479) ** (-7.6685) *** (-2.7714) *** (-11.9822) *** (-5.9776) *** 
AUDIT 0.0029 0.0030 -0.0021 -0.0094 0.0083 -0.0029 -0.0026 
 (1.1619)  (0.9426)  (-0.5152)  (-0.8458)  (0.9004)  (-0.6385)  (-0.1321)  
LEV -0.0211 -0.0274 0.0129 -0.0302 0.0379 -0.0502*** 
 0.0061 
 (-3.6016) ***  (-3.7252) *** (1.3227)  (-1.0868)  (1.6302) (-5.0449) *** (0.1255)  
RD_INT 0.0504 0.0245 -0.0894 -0.7438 -1.6322 -0.1039 -2.3611 
 (1.2512) (0.4816) (-1.4184) (-3.9706) *** (-10.9334) *** (-1.5186) (-7.4615) *** 
GOV 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0015 0.0018 0.0002 0.0033 
 (1.6045)  (1.1972)  (-1.2114)  (2.0708) ** (2.9250) *** (0.7226)  (2.6991) *** 
AGE -0.0015 0.0018 0.0052 -0.0028 -0.0009 0.0065 -0.0037 
 (-1.4909) (1.4370) (3.1901) *** (-0.5717)  (-0.2173)  (3.8866) *** (-0.4486)  
ADMIRED 0.0016 0.0010 -0.0024 0.0191 0.0211 0.0072 0.0390 
 (0.7610)  (0.3692)  (-0.7608)  (1.6932) * (2.3924) ** (2.0982) ** (2.0798) ** 
INVESTOR 0.0014 -0.0003 -0.0029 0.0060 0.0046 -0.0012 0.0099 
 (2.4452) **  (-0.3762)  (-3.5310) *** (2.3830) ** (2.1596) ** (-1.3106)  (2.2866) ** 
CREDITOR -0.0007 0.0005 0.0020 -0.0063 -0.0055 -0.0005 -0.0119 
 (-1.5538)  (0.7979) (2.8539) ***  (-3.3583) ***  (-3.7882) ***  (-0.6672) (-3.8973) ***  
Intercept 0.0762 0.0552 -0.1039 0.2245*** 0.1691 0.0665 0.4046 
 (7.8197) *** (4.5528) *** (-6.4886) *** (4.9346) ***  (4.3564) *** (3.7792) *** (5.1551) *** 
INDUSTRY 
dummies included 
 included included  included included  included included  
YEAR 
dummy included 
 included included  included included  included included  
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.085 0.184  0.164  0.134  0.334  0.149  
n 1,426 775 651  1,426  1,426  1,426  1,426  
F-Statistic 10.96 4.662 8.907  14.810  13.40  35.980  14.040  
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics based on robust standard errors (in parentheses). ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. Our main 
research interest is the association between CSP and our proxies for earnings management activities ABS_DA, 
POS_DA, NEG_DA, RM_PROD, RM_DISX, RM_CFO and COM_RM. 
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